

REFLECTIONS ON

THE STRUCTURE OF THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO OF MARX AND ENGELS

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1. The CM is divided into four parts:
 - a) Part 1 “Bourgeois and Proletarians” recounts the history of the differentiation of society into classes and the emergence of class struggles -- what Marx and Engels believed to be the engine of historical dynamics: “the history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles.”
 - b) Part 2 “Proletarians and Communists” defines the relation of those in the communist movement with the “proletariat”, identifying its vision, aspirations and goals with those of the proletariat itself, in the contemporary class struggles, transcending partisan political affiliations and even family, ethnic and national identities. “Abolition of the family...Rescue education from the influence of the ruling class...The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself *the* nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.”
 - c) Part 3 “Socialist and Communist Literature” voices a warning against ersatz revolutionary movements reflected in the literature which is classified in three major categories:
 - i) Reactionary Socialism manifested in three classes:
 - (1) Feudal socialism
 - (2) Petty-Bourgeois Socialism, and
 - (3) German or ‘True’ Socialism
 - ii) Conservative, or Bourgeois, Socialism summed up in the phrase: “the bourgeois is a bourgeois – for the benefit of the working class.” M&E here refer to members of the bourgeoisie – economists, philanthropists, humanitarians, improvers of the condition of the working class, organizers of charity, SPCMA members, temperance fanatics, bleeding heart types of all kinds -- who seek redress for social grievances but in order precisely to secure the continued existence of the bourgeoisie and bourgeois society.
 - iii) Critical-Utopian Socialism and Communism - the brand of Socialism and Communism visualized in the Utopian economic and social visions of such as Saint Simon, Fourier, Owen and others - who reject all political, and especially all revolutionary, action; they wish to attain their ends by peaceful means, and endeavor, by small experiments, necessarily doomed to failure, by the force of example, to pave the way for the new social Gospel advocated by each.
 - d) Part 4, “Position of the Communists in Relation to the Various Existing Opposition Parties” cites the specific modalities of Communist collaboration

with opposition parties in France, Switzerland, Poland, Germany, and its support of every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things, and their advocacy of revolutions everywhere as the only way to overthrow existing social conditions. The movement seeks solidarity with all revolutionary movements everywhere.

- e) It ends with the ringing exhortation: “Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. WORKING MEN OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE”

2. Following this structure, the manifesto of Philippine revolutionary movement would have four parts to correspond with the CM:

- a) A part 1 that analyzes the historical roots of the present unjust economic, political and social order the bipolarization of society into a dominant class composed of a small minority of the population but appropriating the major proportion of the country’s life support, and a large and growing majority struggling to make ends meet with the remaining diminishing proportion of the country’s life-sustaining resources and identifying the most strategic forces and classes in that unjust structure. The history of colonization, the structures of the colonial apparatus – governing the integral domination – role of individuals, collectives and the external apparatuses of domination and the internal forces of domination and subjection.
- b) A part 2 that defines the revolutionary movement – the precise sense in which it is a revolution relying not on force of arms but on forces of human transformation that effect a revolution more transforming than any mere armed coup that only changes occupants of the seats of power, installs new persons in the positions of control, but changes nothing else – in the end leaving intact the bipolar differentiation of society and the injustice in the distribution of life-supporting resources, capital, production and income flows. Unlike the CM, Part 2 here would explain why this movement focuses not on class differentiation and conflict but on the reasons in nature for communal solidarity in the human species from the individual to the family to the tribe to the ethnic group, to the region and the nation, and the vital need for an integral view of the communality and commonality of human interests in their habitats. Marxism does not view the problem to lie in the mode of income distribution or the violation of “Distributive Justice” and sees these issues as irrelevant to the roots of the current plight of the suffering majority. The problem is in the Mode of production, the social relations resulting from the Mode of Production represented by the bourgeois capitalistic society, under which the present inequitable distribution satisfies its own norms of “distributive justice.” So any sort of superficial reform that does not overturn this whole system dictated by the social division of labor particular to bourgeois capitalism is not a remedy. We agree with the description but not with the diagnostic analysis nor with the utopian prescription offered by the Marxist of a Communist society where there will no longer be a social division of labor, nor do we believe in the inevitability of that future utopia. Marx’s utopia calls for the abolition of the family, the clan, the tribe, the nation. He failed to see that what the classical view missed was the essential character of the organic unity of the basic human community within

which social differentiation and division of functions working for the good of the whole organism had a vital role. Rather we view the next mode of production to be a restoration of family, community and nationalist values based on a far more decentralized complex of community scale means of production that 21st century technology makes possible and feasible. This is the view that carries the movement away from the polemics of the nineteenth to the realities of the 21st century!

- c) A Part 3 that explains how this movement is revolutionary in its seeking the overthrow of the ruling economic, social and political order (neo-classical), but for ends and through means differing in theory, in ideology and in practice from the Communism of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, or Mao, as well as from the superficial programs of so-called reforms advocated by political and civil society groups in the country – that even when achieving the full measure of their goals and visions would leave the unjust character of the economic, political and social structure unchanged and the plight of the majority of our people in the same dire conditions.
- d) A Part 4 that relates the movement to the suffering majority of our people and the precise ways in which they are to be empowered to overthrow the oppressive economic, political and social structures that hold them in thrall, and make them the masters of their fate and the captains of their souls.

3. The story-line of Part 1 would be as follows:

- a) Not just human but all history is a history of struggle – among and between physical, chemical, biological, psychological, spiritual forces. Out of that struggle the planet earth emerged from the cosmic forces of the universe, elements differentiated and combined into substances, atoms, molecules, bodies of water, land forms and terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems, living cells, tissues, organs, organisms, land forms, flora fauna, inhabitants of the varied habitats, individuals and societies, human beings and their communities, families, tribes, nations, empires.
- b) Out of that cosmic struggle these 7000 islands emerged that became the habitat of waves of migrants going back to the earliest migrations of ancient peoples from whatever spot on the planet the first hominids and earliest homo sapiens first awakened into consciousness. Prehistoric origins are spotty, but evidence of early humans in the Tabon Cave of Palawan. Archaeological evidence of tribal chiefdoms on these islands. Early Chinese documents record relations with developed chiefdoms.
- c) Class differentiation very much part of human history, and part of ours. No need to romanticize the economic-social-political structures of these early tribal chiefdoms settled on these islands. Life was hard and cruel. Powerful tribes took slaves. There were ruling elites and ruled majorities. Ruling classes controlled the use of natural resources and took more than their proportionate share of the harvests from those resources.
- d) Nature does not distribute talents and abilities equally and everywhere minorities with abilities that empower, physical, mental, emotional gain power over

majorities'. There as everywhere on the planet, human history was a struggle between egalitarian practices and satisfaction of the demands of the powerful. All evolution – of individuals as well as of groups, human and non human creatures, inanimate and animate nature – is the story of struggles precisely to balance individual desires and more general communal welfare – between avarice and compassion. This struggle takes place within and between physical particles and elements, cells, tissues, organs within organisms ,organisms of different species, in creation, human individuals, families, social classes, communities, nations and species.

- e) Out of that struggle there emerged the different civilizations of the world, the differentiation of families, tribes, classes, communities and nations, differentiation according to religious beliefs and cultures, trade and empire building. The story of our people as the Filipino nation and the Philippines as a country begins with the outreach of European imperialism on our shores.
- f) Important to understand the process of colonization of tribal communities organized into separate chiefdoms forcibly placed within the domain of another society itself going through its own evolutionary process. Important to have an integral understanding of that process in all the quadrants of understanding – the external impact on individuals and on groups – families, tribes, communities and the internal transformations imposed by this cultural aggression. There is external as well as internal colonization, there are individual as well as collective aspects to the process, that includes individual beliefs, life styles, action and behavior patterns as well as cultural aspects on whole societies, institutions, economic, political, social and religious structures, etc.
- g) Important to understand the colonization process as an integral process to understand as well how the process of decolonization can be only partial and leave substantial mechanisms, worldviews, lifestyle patters, and cultural, economic, political and religious structures in place.
- h) We have to explain the generic process of domination to explain how a minority keeps a majority in thrall and the process of evolving benevolent power structures that create a regime of justice and equity in economic, political and social affairs. Systems of power by which minorities control majorities are a permanent fact in all creation. Rule by a majority is the meaning of chaos. And this is true of all creation. By definition it takes a more complex holon to exercise control over component holons in a community or a system.
- i) But the rule is that holons with greater depth have smaller scopes or are smaller in population. The most complex will be also have the smallest number. Control is always by the minority. But what internal evolution must take place to ensure that the power of the minority is exercised for the good of the majority, this is the question. And this is what we have to understand.
- j) The early animistic societies divided into tribal chiefdoms.
- k) Islamization process antedated Hispanic colonization. Islamized community existed. An Islamic nation had formed in Sulu Archipelago, Lanao, Cotabato,

Palawan, and had just begun to form on Luzon. Animist societies continued in the Mountain tribes.

- l) Spanish colonization accompanied by Christianization aborted the Islamization of Luzon but could not overcome the more rigorously Islamized nation in Mindanao nor totally the animist tribes in the uplands – e.g. the Lumads in Mindanao, the Hanunuo in Mindoro, the Negrito and Dumagats on the Sierra Madres in Luzon. In this regime the differentiation into classes and social sectors – the stratification of Filipino society – the Ilustrados and the Masa, the state and the church systems, and how the majority fared. The evolution of colonial policy and strategy as they followed the evolution of European economy and society.
- m) The control over resources and wealth, the patterns and the forces of production, and the theories, ideology, world views and belief systems that sustained the ruling order.
- n) The Christianized nation, the Islamic and the NonChristian tribes became the three main components of what became the Philippines, that revolted against the Spanish colonial regime, and which the Americans preempted from the Filipino revolution.
- o) The process of external and internal, individual and collective American colonization of the Philippines and the Filipinos. The resulting changes in economic, social and political structure (LR Quadrant) in the beliefs and lifestyles of individuals (UL), and in culture of society and social behavior patterns, values (LL Quadrant) .
- p) The unfinished decolonization process and the growth and evolution of the unjust economic, political and social order and what beliefs, worldviews, values sustain the continuance of the colonial regime. What continues in place that spells effective colonization of our people?
 - i) The LR elements: the system of governance, the centralized structure of government, the business system and the economic structure – the system of private property, , the class structure, distribution of power, the elite families, the political dynasties, the Church structure.
 - ii) The UL elements – American individualism, the personal values, dreams, ambitions, notions of success and failure, market challenge and winners and losers, the lifestyle, the psychology, belief system
 - iii) The LL elements - the consumer patterns, the cultural value system, the lifestyle and peer pressure patterns, notions of the good life, westernization, lack of love for local community, lack of ethnic solidarity, or sense of nation, patterns of political behavior – the elements of a culture of dependency, the social psychology of the dominated and the oppressed, acceptance and resignation to life of poverty, lack of indignation over injustice and oppression, the culture of the colonized

- q) The political process continues the system while it merely changes the occupants of the seats of power.
 - r) Nothing short of a revolution will change the situation. But what kind of a revolution?
4. Part 2 would then define what sort of a revolutionary movement we need and which we are mounting and how it relates to the oppressed majority and empowers them. It will be the continuation to completion and final victory of the whole de colonization process.
- a) It must start from the UL Quadrant elements,
 - b) It must move into the LL Quadrant
 - c) And then overthrow the LR structures and replace them with new structures.
 - d) It must develop instruments of empowerment for the majority. It is a process of liberation therefore and needs a leadership with a liberalization spirituality and fervor and a theory and ideology of liberation. This is the way the movement will relate to the oppressed majority.
 - e) If the CM calls for the abolition of the family and the setting aside of ethnic and national, identity, this movement must return solidarity with family, tribe ethnic and national identity to build up the forces of solidarity and love.
5. Part 3: will define how this movement differs from others in its revolutionary character and in the transformations it advocates, the vision it raises and in the methods it proposes for achieving victory. What basis does it offer for building assurance of its ultimate victory.
- a) Revolutionary but in a way different from Marxist-Engelian-Leninist-Stalinist-Maoist revolution.
 - b) Reforms and transformations different in final vision and method of minimalist political, and social movements and advocacies.
6. Part 4 will recount how the movement will empower the majority and ensure their final victory.

REVISITING THE MARXIAN REVOLUTIONARY IDEA FROM A 21ST CENTURY PHILIPPINE PERSPECTIVE

THE MARXIAN REVOLUTIONARY IDEA

1. Robert C. Tucker, Harvard Ph.D. and professor of politics at Princeton University, in a 1969 book, "The Marxian Revolutionary Idea" gives a most useful analysis of the Marx-Engels theory and ideology of Communist Revolution. He particularly makes certain points that correct popular impressions of the classical Marxist position.
2. Start with his proposition that "the revolutionary idea was the keystone" of Marxism as fashioned by Marx with the assistance of Engels, "a theory and program of revolution", of its theoretical structure. From its seminal concepts articulated in his doctoral dissertation of 1841, he sought in his theorizing a basis for the complete revolutionary transformation of the world in the name of the "realization of philosophy" embodied in Hegel's philosophy of humanity's apotheosis in history.
3. He was thus committed to the idea of a world revolution even prior to his conversion to the notions of socialism or communism. Only after he became a member of the school of Young Hegelian philosophers, and worked out in his mind a fusion of socialism or communism into the philosophy of world revolution, did he embrace communism. The intellectual process by which he managed this fusion is recorded in his *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*.
4. His socialism was thus inseparable from his idea of revolution in the sense of a radically new state of the world and of man in the world that could only be achieved by a complete overthrow of the ruling order. Thus the *Communist Manifesto* sharply distinguishes Marxism from the earlier currents of socialist movements such those of Saint Simon, Fourier, and Owen among others. (See Part 3 of the CM) which he saw as merely reformist rather than revolutionary.
5. The Marxist revolutionary idea is as complex and multidimensional as the whole Marxist theory therefore: encompassing social, economic, technological, political, legal, and ideological elements and processes -- even, in its way a natural phenomenon involving the appropriation of the man-produced world of material objects that Marx labeled in his early writings "anthropological nature" or "nature produced by history." Revolution means for Marx transformation of man himself as in his view "the whole of history is nothing but a continual transformation of human nature." It had moral and religious dimensions in the sense that he saw the future communist revolution as effecting in the human person a "change of self." Finally revolution is an essential theoretical component of the materialist frame of history -- the inevitable process of the transformation of society in history, even a theory of history itself as a process of man's revolutionary evolution.
6. The 1844 manuscripts that only came to light in the 20th century reveals the genesis of Marxism from Hegelian idealist philosophy. In these manuscripts, Marx derives his position from a "translation" of Hegelian philosophy, into what he considered realistic or truly scientific terms, by what amounted to a process of "inversion" in which the subjects of Hegelian philosophy became predicates and the predicates subject. But key concepts of Marxism such as "alienation (*Entfremdung*)" and

“appropriation (*Aneignung*)” for example were Hegel’s but acquired in Marx’s inversion process new meanings.

7. Taking his cue from Ludwig Feuerbach, he assumed he had to draw a distinction between the manifest content of Hegelianism, which he considered “mystical” and the latent or “esoteric” content which he viewed to be the scientifically sound dimension.
 - a) The “Mystical” Hegel propositions:
 - i) World history is the self-realization of God as Spirit (*Geist*). Creation takes place in historical time through a process by which God becomes fully God in the world.
 - ii) God first externalizes himself the form of Nature – Spirit acting through humanity, externalizes itself in a succession of historical civilizations or culture worlds. It then “appropriates” these culture worlds in thought through the minds of the great philosophers down to Hegel. History is thus seen as a process of “production.”
 - iii) God becomes fully God in the course of this process by becoming aware of himself as such, for on Hegel’s definition self-knowledge or self-consciousness belongs to the nature (or concept) of God.
 - iv) But for God to become aware of himself as God is to become aware of himself as infinite being, or of all reality as Spirit, as “subjective.” This proceeds in stages through history with each historical episode of self-knowledge beginning with Spirit confronted by a seemingly objective world of ‘otherness’ outside and beyond it.
 - v) This experience of being bounded by an object is portrayed by Hegel as an experience of finitude, which in turn is an experience of alienation (*Entfremdung*). That is to say, the knowing mind experiences the given objective world as alien and hostile in its otherness before recognizing it as Spirit in externalized form.
 - vi) Hence, knowing for Hegel is “de-alienation” by which the given form of external reality produced by Spirit is stripped of its illusory strangeness and made ‘property of the ego.’
 - vii) The terminal point in the unfolding of this historical process of self-knowledge (described by Hegel as a progress of the consciousness of freedom through the overcoming of the fetters of finitude) is the stage of ‘absolute knowledge’, when Spirit finally beholds the absolute totality of creation as Spirit. God thus achieves full realization in the knowledge of itself as Absolute Being.
 - viii) That terminal point Hegel considered the achievement of Hegelianism – the scientific demonstration of the entire process of world history.
 - b) Hegel’s ‘translation/inversion’ becomes the ‘latent/esoteric’ or scientific content:
 - i) Hegel’s idea of God’s self-realization is really the self-realization of humanity, the human historical process.
 - ii) Man was not *Geist* in the flesh. *Geist* was the thought-process in the head of real, material man in actual history.
 - iii) History was not the process by which God becomes fully God in man. That was Hegel’s mental representation of the historical process which in reality and actuality was a process by which man becomes fully human.

- iv) The world-creating activity in history was not thought-production going on in God's mind. The reality was the world is produced in a historical process of *material* production carried on by man in his economic life. So that the true and scientific conception of history esoterically present in Hegelianism was a 'materialist' one that views man as the universal creator and material production – of material objects – is the basic human productive activity.
 - v) Spirit's experience of self-alienation in the presence of an alien and hostile world of its own creation was the mystical version in Hegel of the real fact esoterically present in his theory of the working man's experience of alienation in the presence of a world of material objects that he himself has created in 'alienated labor' in the service of another man – the capitalist – who appropriates the product as his private property.
 - vi) Appropriation (*Aneignung*), was not, therefore, something going on in the philosopher's mind. Rather, the Hegelian notion of the cognitive appropriation of the world by Spirit was an inverted representation of the material appropriation of objects in history, the accumulation of capital.
 - vii) Further the overcoming of alienation or de-alienation was a process that would take place not simply in thought but in actual history. The alienated world was a world of real material things and productive powers, the appropriation of it by the exploited and alienated producers, the proletarians, would take place in a real revolution – a communist revolution consisting in the worldwide seizure and socialization of private property.
 - viii) Finally, Hegel's picture of the ultimate stage of 'Absolute Knowledge' when Spirit contemplates the whole world as Spirit in the beatific moment of complete self-awareness in freedom, was only a philosopher's fantasy. The reality would be an ultimate communism when man would achieve self-fulfillment in creative activity and aesthetic experience of the no longer alienated world surrounding him.
- c) This seminal theorizing in the young Marx of the 1844 manuscripts was refined, elaborated and augmented in the subsequent development of the system by Marx and Engels but remained the matrix of the mature Marxist *Weltanschauung*.
- i) In *The German Ideology* Part I, the category of 'alienation' while abandoned in its original formulation, was carried on in the special meaning it acquired within the concept of the 'division of labor.'
 - ii) History became viewed as the growth-process of humanity from the primitive beginnings to complete maturity and self-realization in future communism.
 - iii) Man, in his essential nature, the creative being or producer, evolves in history through a developmental process Marx calls a *Produktionsgeschichte* (*history of production*) with material production as the primary kind of activity, moving through a series of epochs marked by the division of mankind into warring classes towards the postulated communist future.
 - iv) The transitions from epoch to epoch are revolutionary, for 'revolutions are the locomotive of history.'

Marxism as Social Theory

8. For Marx, *social* revolution was the fundamental revolutionary fact. It is the whole organic process by which a new society comes into being. The political revolution is

merely a momentous incident occurring at the climax of the process at the cusp of each epoch.

9. But what did *social* revolution mean in Marx's system?
 - a) An answer on behalf of German orthodox Marxism was supplied by Kautsky in *The Social Revolution*, an influential little volume written in 1902.
 - i) He defined social revolution as "the conquest of political power by a previously subservient class and the transformation of the juridical and political superstructure of society, particularly in the property relations..."
 - ii) Kautsky was careful to point out that this was a 'narrower' view than Marx's own expressed in the preface to the *Critique of Political Economy*.
 - iii) Tucker considered it also somewhat superficial. "Although the supplanting of one ruling class by another is integral to social revolution as Marx conceives it, this formula fails to convey the substance of what he means by social revolution."
 - b) In Tucker's view the more adequate formulation requires an understanding of Marx's conception of society – which is one with his whole, materialist, conception of the history. "Marx the sociologist is inseparable from Marx the theorist of history."
 - i) While he recognized that societies existed on a national scale, he did not see nations as the fundamental unit of society. The real social unit for him is the whole human species, the human collectivity at a given stage of its historical growth-process.
 - ii) These growth-stages were important analytical units for each was dominated by a particular 'social formation.' The actual national differentiations in history – such as the German, English, or French, were but concrete expressions of human society as a whole in the given epoch, even when any of them might exhibit the general pattern of the existing or emerging social formation most clearly in most mature development.
 - iii) He saw the contemporary English society, for example, as the model and most advanced form of a universally emerging 'bourgeois society' of the modern epoch, the capitalist social formation now becoming dominant on a world scale.
 - iv) The social formations that preceded it were feudal, antique, and Asiatic social formations, which were dominant forms of human society each in its own time.
 - v) Marx thus saw each social revolution as universal in scope, an event of world history, rather than a purely national phenomenon. It may express itself here and there on a national scale, as in the French Revolution of 1789, but such a happening is only a partial and local manifestation of a world revolutionary process. For Marx, "All social revolutions are world revolutions."

- c) His social theory was one with his materialist conception of history.
- i) Man is essentially a producer and his history is a 'history of production.'
 - ii) Society then is essentially a productive system and process. The essential character of society, its constitutive nature, is the mode of its productive activity, especially the material production on which all else depends.
 - iii) Material production is therefore essentially social in nature. For Marx it is a process going on not simply between man and nature but also between man and man. This 'social process of production' is also the core of the social process per se, and human society is fundamentally a society of production, a set of 'social relations' that men enter in the activity of producing.
 - iv) This is articulated clearly in *The Critique of Political Economy*. The basis (*Basis, Grundlage*) of society is defined by the configuration of the social relations of production. That basis generates the whole institutional superstructure of society to which there corresponds a social mind expressed in various 'ideological forms' (religion, philosophy, art, etc.).
 - (1) Since primitive times, social formation of the productive system has divided society into immediate producers and those who, by virtue of their power, ownership and control over the means of production, have been able to appropriate the surplus product produced by the producers as private property.
 - (2) Whether the social systems have been slavery in ancient society, serfs and landowning nobles in feudal society, proletarians and capitalists in modern bourgeois society, the differentiation and division has been the same.
 - (3) There has been through history thus far therefore at work a 'division of labor' (*Teilung der Arbeit*) in production, which has a twofold meaning in Marxist thought:
 - (a) An occupational specialization in all its forms beginning with the division between mental and physical labor and between town and country.
 - (b) But, second, it also refers to a 'social division of labor' or society's division into a nonworking minority consisting of owners of the means of production and a nonowning majority class of workers.
 - (4) This process of division of labor in production has generated the class differentiations of society all through human history thus far. As Engels wrote: "It is...the law of division of labor which lies at the root of the division into classes." And Marx in his *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, p. 109:

In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that divide their mode of life, their interests, and their culture from those of other classes, and put them in hostile contrast to the latter, they form a class.
 - v) The class structure of society is determined by the nature of the social division of labor that in turn is a function of what Marx called the 'mode of production' (*Produktionsweise*).

- (1) This mode of production may be particular to each society, and contrary to what might be readily supposed, is primarily social rather than technological although it has a technological element.
 - (2) Marx distinguishes between the mode of production or *Produktionsweise* and the 'Means of Production (*Produktionsmittels*)'
 - (a) What Marx means by the mode of production is the prevailing mode of labor or productive activity that is conditioned by but not identical with the existing state of technology or means of production. This mode is exclusively and essentially *social activity*, equivalent to the social relations of production viewed dynamically or in motion as transforming with the developments in the conditioning state of technology.
 - (b) The means of production refer to the material 'productive powers' or the productive technique, the instruments that physically embody the current state of the technology.
- vi) The changes in the modes or the social relations of production through history have so far been reflections of the successive forms of the division of labor in production. Production within the division of labor has thus been the *general* mode of production in history. In the words of Engel, in *Anti-Dubring*: "The basic form of all former production is the division of labor, on the one hand within society as a whole, and on the other, within each separate productive establishment."
- d) "The central thesis then of Marxist sociology is that every society in history has been characterized and indeed shaped in all its manifold aspects by the nature of its particular mode of production..." Tucker, p. 15
- i) In ancient society the mode of production was slave labor, or productive activity performed within the social division of labor between master and slave.
 - ii) In feudal society it was serf labor, or productive activity within the social division of labor between nobleman and serf.
 - iii) In modern bourgeois society it is wage labor, or productive activity performed within the social division of labor between capitalist and proletarian.
- e) In every instance ... the mode of productive activity has been the definitive fact of the social epoch, the determinant of society in all of its superstructural expressions: political, legal, intellectual, religious, etc. ...every society fundamentally *is* its mode of production, Of wage labor, for example, Marx writes in *The Class Struggles in France*: "Without it there is no capital, no bourgeoisie, no bourgeois society"
- f) We can now define more precisely what Marx and Engels mean by "social revolution." It "is a change in the mode of production with consequent change of all subordinate elements of the social complex."
- i) The feudal revolution is the change from slave labor to serf labor resulting in the general transition to feudal society;

- ii) The bourgeois revolution is the change from serf labor to wage labor resulting in the general transition to bourgeois society.
 - iii) Historically, these revolutions in the mode of production as the consequent changes in society as a whole have been changes in the *specific form* of productive activity within the social division of labor. They have been revolutions within the general mode of production based upon the division of labor in society and the production process, i.e. upon the class division of society and occupational specialization.
- g) But how then do changes in technology and in the forces of production, or the means of production, enter into the process?
- i) In Marxism, every historical mode of production has been conditioned by the available means of production or state of technology. This quote from Marx's *The Poverty of Philosophy* is a vivid illustration: "The windmill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist."
 - ii) According to this view then, the rise of a new technology, a new set of productive powers, will necessarily prove incompatible with the perpetuation of a mode of production associated with an older one.
 - (1) The rise of modern manufacturing techniques led to the bourgeois revolution against serf labor and feudal society and to the enthronement of wage labor as the mode of production.
 - (2) Further, the transition from early capitalist manufacture to 'machinofacture' in the Industrial Revolution has brought into existence a new set of productive powers – modern machine industry – that must and will prove incompatible with the perpetuation of wage labor as the prevailing mode of production, since the new powers of production cannot be fully developed under the system of wage labor.
 - (3) The destruction of wage labor, and with it, bourgeois society, in a proletarian and communist revolution is the predicted outcome.
 - iii) Marx and Engels used this reasoning to define social revolution as the resolution of a conflict or 'contradiction' between the productive powers and social relations of production, or as a 'rebellion' of the former against the latter.
 - (1) In this formulation, 'rebellion' must not be understood in mechanistic terms. It is not the material powers of production themselves, such as the machines, that rebel against the mode of production.
 - (2) The social revolution that originates from technological change is really a social-political movement of producers as a class since Marx views working man as the supreme productive power. "Of all the instruments of production," he wrote in *The Poverty of Philosophy* p. 190, "the greatest productive power is the revolutionary class itself."

- (3) The revolt of the productive powers against the existing social relations of production finds its manifestation in class warfare in the economic arena, culminating in the political act of revolutionary overthrow of the state. IF REVOLUTIONS ARE THE LOCOMOTIVES OF HISTORY, CLASS STRUGGLES ARE THE LOCOMOTIVES OF REVOLUTION.

The Springs of Revolution

10. What motivations build up such a force as to move a class of producers to rise against and revolutionize a mode of production and its social superstructure?
- a) Is it the suffering caused by material want and poverty brought about by the distribution of production gains under the ruling social relations of production? While this is acknowledged to be one of the immediate driving forces of revolutionary action especially with the modern proletariat, in the Marxist theory, material satisfaction on “unjust distribution” are never the central issues in the revolutionary action that transforms an existing social formation.
- b) What then is the central motivation? What is fundamentally at issue in the class struggle and in social revolution, as in history as a whole, is not the *consumption* interest, but the *production* interest defined in a special Marxist way. In Tucker’s summation of the Marx-Engel position:

It is man as frustrated producer rather than man as dissatisfied consumer who makes a revolution, and the need of man as producer to freely develop and express his manifold powers of productive activity, his creative potentialities in material life. (pp 17-18)

- c) Marx includes under the heading of man’s productive powers both the innate creativity and artisan skills of man as *homo faber*, and the material and productive forces employed by the human species in its productive interaction with nature.
- i) In *Capital*, the material forces of production are described as “the productive organs of men in society... [comparable to] the organs of plants and animals as productive instruments utilized for the life purposes of these creatures.”
- ii) The frustration of this productive drive in an existing mode of production or socio-economic order that inhibits the full development of new powers of production creates a powerful revolutionary energy.
- iii) Thus the bourgeois revolution drew its transforming energies from the inability of the rising capitalist class to develop the new productive powers inherent in manufacture within the cramping confines of feudal relationships.
- iv) Marx believed (erroneously in Tucker’s judgment) the impossibility of fully developing the productive potentials of modern machine industry within the confines of wage labor as the mode of production would necessitate and precipitate a proletarian revolution.

- v) To generalize Marx's theory in this regard, using Hegelian terminology, a revolution becomes inevitable when the ruling social relations of production place a 'fetter' upon the evolving productive powers of the species. The revolution becomes necessary to 'emancipate' those evolving productive powers, making freedom, in the specific sense of the liberation of human creativity, the goal of all social revolutions.

- d) In Marx-Engel historical analysis, the principal obstacle to freedom, the source of human bondage, and hence the primary evil in history thus far has been the *social division of labor (SDOL)*. This is the fundamental thesis of Marxist theory.
 - i) All through the history of the human species thus far, each successive historical form of SDOL differentiating and dissociating an owning and a producing class, has become an impediment to the free development of emergent productive powers.

 - ii) SDOL is a force for enslavement. It subjects the producer class to the acquisitive urge of the owning class which, in Marx's view, makes insensate power and greed, rather than sensitive compassion and sharing love, the dominant motive force of historical development. But only thus far, and until the dawn of the communist era. To quote Engels in his *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*: "...it is precisely the wicked passions of man – greed and lust for power – which, since the emergence of class antagonisms, serve as levers of historical development..."

 - iii) Throughout all of history thus far, therefore, man the producer has been forced into a life of drudgery, forced, or what Marx in his 1844 manuscripts called 'alienated labor'. This has not only carried on into the modern age, but has [Marx viewing the state of labor in the second half of the 19th century in Europe] worsened. Although in that era workers were legally free to seek employment wherever he wanted, he is in reality bound down to wage labor. In *Das Kapital* Marx defines this condition as productive activity performed in service to the capitalist profit mania, the 'werewolf hunger' for surplus value.

 - iv) In *The German Ideology* (Marx and Engels), Marx views the occupational specialization resulting from SDOL as an enemy of human freedom:

For as soon as labor is distributed, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood.

- v)

MARX VERSUS LIST ON NATIONALISM

[Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx Versus Friedrich List](#)
Book by Roman Szporluk; Oxford US, 1991

When one bears all of this in mind, it is easy to see why Marx found the theories of List, particularly his view of history and his program for the future, not only objectionable but aberrant. The doctrine of List, Marx was convinced, contradicted everything then taking place in the development of society--before his, and List's, eyes. It was axiomatic to Marx that industrial progress intensified and sharpened the antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, an antagonism that would in the immediate future explode in a violent revolution. List, in the meantime, preached class cooperation and solidarity in the building of a nation's power. Marx thought that the Industrial Revolution, and the concomitant rule of the bourgeoisie, promoted the unification of the world and obliterated national differences. (Communism, he thought, would abolish nations themselves.) List claimed that the same phenomenon, the Industrial Revolution, intensified national differences and exacerbated conflicts among nations.

While Marx saw the necessity of workers uniting across nations against the bourgeoisie, List called for the unification of all segments of a nation against other nations. Marx criticized the political ideas of 1789 and their realization in the modern capitalist state by arguing that political liberty was illusory: It ignored the realities of "society," in which private property reigned and in which man was oppressed by man. The task was to abolish politics altogether by carrying out a complete social revolution and thereby to free man as a human being. List also criticized the political theories and institutions of the West. The real basis for a political community for List was the community of a nation, which he defined by cultural (including linguistic) criteria, and to which he wanted to adjust political boundaries. But List concentrated his critique specifically on the rules that regulated the relations among nations, especially the rules of free trade. As we shall see, List considered free trade a cover-up for unequal relations among nations, just as Marx thought political liberty was an ideological cover for class oppression.

The most urgent and significant item on Marx's political agenda was the call for a revolution of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. What was he to do when List came along with his absurd assertion that the most important task for the Germans was to unite against England so that their nation might equal and surpass her rival economically, culturally, and politically?

It is one of the central ideas of this study that nationalism--let us stress this point over and over again--was not a product of the Industrial Revolution, but rather had been born beforehand, and that a specifically nationalist reaction to the Industrial Revolution was not reducible to the liberal, conservative, or socialist position.

Those who limit themselves to identifying liberal, conservative, and socialist positions do not always remember that these classifications tacitly presuppose the existence of an established polity. Furthermore, such a perspective assumes that this polity is fairly well developed, for it consists of the bourgeoisie, the landed proprietors, and the industrial workers, whose respective interests these three positions or ideologies "reflect." Leaving aside the crude reductionism involved in its assignment of ideologies to particular economic classes, this approach overlooks the fact that the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were periods when new national communities were being formed, when various premodern states, ethnic groups, regional identities, and religious communities were being transformed into nations. While liberals, conservatives, and socialists indeed responded to the Industrial Revolution within already existing societies and polities, there were also nationalists who were engaged in establishing new communities and who, in the process, asked how the Industrial Revolution affected the position of their respective nations--often nations in the making--versus other nations.

This discussion has already provided numerous themes around which to compare and contrast Marxism and nationalism. Yet another theme can now be added. As people approached the challenges generated by the Industrial Revolution in terms that were in one way or another informed by the French Revolution, many of them realized that the two revolutions implied different solutions to the question of authority and leadership in society. The message of 1789 was of course liberty, equality, fraternity, democracy, and sovereignty of the nation. The key questions raised by the Industrial Revolution, however, concerned expert, specialist leadership: They focused on the role of the manager, the scientist, the engineer, and the entrepreneur. How was the economy's management by the bosses to be reconciled with popular politics?

Marx thought that he had a solution for this problem, just as he had for everything else, in his overall scheme of revolution. The liberals, democrats, and conservatives also had their own ideas about who should lead the nation, who should run the economy, and what the relationship between politics and "civil society" should be. But so did the nationalists.

Bertrand Russell titled his history of the nineteenth century *Freedom versus Organization*, 1814- 1914, and explained in the preface that

The purpose of this book is to trace the opposition and interaction of two main causes of change in the nineteenth century: the belief in FREEDOM which was common to Liberals and Radicals, and the necessity for ORGANIZATION which arose through industrial and scientific technique. ²⁰

Nationalism--and here List is especially important and interesting--had its own approach to the dilemmas created by the confrontation of "freedom," the message of 1789, with "organization," the issue made central by the rise of industry.

Although he did not put it in precisely these words, Alexander Gerschenkron touched on the same issue in a wider framework when in his influential essay, "Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective" (1962), he evaluated the historical role of nationalism in general and of List specifically. Gerschenkron argued that in England, where industrialization occurred first, rational arguments in favor of industrialization did not need to be supported with "a quasi-religious fervor." However, in France, Germany, and Russia, which entered the path of industrialization after Britain, it was necessary to create "ideologies of delayed industrializations" as a "spiritual vehicle of an industrialization program"; a laissezfaire ideology was inadequate for that purpose. "In a backward country the great and sudden industrialization effort calls for a New Deal in emotions."

To break through the barriers of stagnation in a backward country, to ignite the imaginations of men, and to place their energies in the service of economic development, a stronger medicine is needed than the promise of better allocation of resources or even of the lower price of bread. Under such conditions even the businessman, even the classical daring and innovating entrepreneur, needs a more powerful stimulus than the prospect of high profits. What is needed to remove the mountains of routine and prejudice is faith--faith, in the words of Saint-Simon, that the golden age lies not behind but ahead of mankind. ²¹

According to Gerschenkron, the doctrines of Saint-Simon became the ideology of industrialization in France. (As we see, Gerschenkron does not lump England together with France under the colorless umbrella called "the West.") In Russia, Marxism assumed that role in the late nineteenth century, and in Germany, the doctrine of List served an analogous function.

Friedrich List's industrialization theories may be largely conceived as an attempt, by a man whose personal ties to Saint-Simonians had been very strong, to translate the inspirational message of Saint-Simonism into a language that would be accepted in the German environment, where the lack of both a preceding political revolution and an early national unification rendered nationalist sentiment a much more suitable ideology of industrialization. ²²

Gerschenkron's scheme offers guidance on how one might handle some of the questions raised here, especially those regarding the historical role of nationalism and its interaction with Marxism. For Gerschenkron, nationalism and Marxism, along with the doctrine of Saint-Simon, were competing theories of industrialization and indeed were rival programs for a modern society.

If modern German historians had paid more attention to List and nationalism, and if they accordingly recognized that there has been a specifically nationalist response to the Industrial Revolution, they would not have blamed the German "bourgeoisie" for its alleged failure to act in conformity with what these historians assume was the only right way for the bourgeoisie to act. These scholars believe that under the original "Western" pattern of development the bourgeoisie had asserted itself firmly against feudalism and seized state power for itself, while the German bourgeoisie allegedly accommodated itself to the old regime, Junkers and all. In consequence, post-1871 Germany supposedly constituted a mixture of premodern politics with a modern economy. This German *Sonderweg* reflected a basic "abnormality" of nineteenth-

century German history--and led straight to Hitler in the twentieth. David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley have subjected this ideological construct to a thorough scrutiny. ²³

For the purposes of our discussion, it is enough to note that the *Sonderweg* theory treats the history of a nation like Germany as an isolated and self-contained process. But if one remembers that the German bourgeoisie "saw its own future reflected" in Britain's "industrial prosperity," ²⁴ one will also recognize that the bourgeoisie believed its less developed country could attain that future only through competition with Britain. This, of course, required that it take this "external" factor into account in domestic politics as well, including the relations between classes, their economic goals, and political aspirations. Such was precisely the point List was making--and the one that Marx refused to recognize when in the 1840s he first formulated his charges against the German bourgeoisie. (See especially Chapters 3 and 4.) The alleged failure or betrayal of the German bourgeoisie was therefore a rational choice in an international framework.

Certain scholars before Gerschenkron also recognized List as a major figure in the history of nationalism and thought him important enough to merit comparison with Marx. As early as 1928, for example, Alfred Meusel published a comparative study of Marx and List. ²⁵ Another scholar, Friedrich Lenz, the author of many List studies, discussed the economic theories of List and Marx in a book published in 1930. ²⁶ Still another author, Karl Löwith, argued in 1941 that Hegel's "achievement in the study of history," "magnificent" though it had been, "was corrected in the nineteenth century by F. List and Marx, both of whom . . . sought with a quick grasp to shape their assumptions concerning the meaning for the world of the new technical and socioeconomic advances." Löwith agreed in his assessment of List with Johann Plenge, who in 1911 viewed List and Marx as the two thinkers who had responded to the realities of a new industrial age that had "shoved Hegel's system aside, showing more simple ways for thought." ²⁷

In more recent scholarship (1964), Eduard Heimann has also drawn attention to List as a key thinker deserving comparison with Marx. According to Heimann, [List] did not content himself with making a general protest against the doctrine of free trade; he attacked it at its root. In fact, his criticism reads almost as if it were Marxian in inspiration. He did not discuss the validity of the theory per se or engage in what he regarded as a purely academic dispute about correct or faulty reasoning. Rather, he blamed the doctrine of free trade on the ground that it was inspired by special interests posing as the general interest, in other words, that it was what Marx later called an ideology. ²⁸

List criticized the classical school for purposely ignoring the fact that free trade among nations--which were of an unequal economic strength affected them differently not only in economics but also in politics and culture. List's criticism of unequal relations between *nations* under free trade constituted, according to Heimann, a "precise parallel" to the criticism that Sismondi and, later, Marx raised regarding the impact of *domestic* laissez faire on individual *classes*. ²⁹

This is indeed a very important point that needs to be stressed: Like Marx, List believed that the economy remained in a close connection with politics, especially in the modern industrial era. List was an economist who not only saw a reciprocal

connection between politics and economics but, like Marx, also linked economics to a broader intellectual structure, a *Weltanschauung* or an ideology, a view of history and society, and a program for the future. Unlike Marx, however, he constructed his *Weltanschauung* to reflect a *national*, not class-oriented, point of view.

At the same time, unlike other economic nationalists (about whom we shall speak later on), List based his program not on the state but on a "cultural nation"--that is, a community of language--for this was what the Germany of his time was. List recognized the role of the state, but that state was to be *national* first. On the basis of Germany's cultural identity, List advocated its economic modernization and political unification, and he accurately saw culture, politics, and economy as linked. For this reason, Hans Gehrig was right to call List the first among political economists who "wanted to raise through economic development a people that had been recognized as a cultural nation (*Kulturnation*) to a political nationhood."³⁰ There was nothing specifically "German" about List's doctrine. As Franz Schnabel observed, any people that wanted to become economically independent could use it.³¹

The distinguished List scholar, Edgar Salin, recognized this universal appeal and enduring relevance of List's ideas when, in 1962, he called him more topical and timely (*aktuell*) in our own time than ever before. On the occasion of the publication of his afterword to List's collected works (the Nazis had suppressed the afterword in 1935, when the final volume appeared), Salin recapitulated his assessment of List:

No scholar of politics and no economist, with the exception of Tocqueville and Marx, had such a brilliant and prescient "insight into the future"--that is, into our present. Nobody should be writing about development of underdeveloped countries without first becoming an apprentice with that great forefather of the theory of growth and the politics of development.³²

While we agree with these opinions, we go even further here: We argue that List's doctrine, linking culture, politics, and economy in a single comprehensive world view, comes closer than the thought of any other individual to capturing the essence of nationalism.

Friedrich Meinecke (1862-1954), Germany's foremost historian of the "idealist" school, considered socialism and nationalism to be "the two waves of the age" after the French Revolution, and he related their rise to the vast increase of population caused by the Industrial Revolution. Socialism was an ideology that enjoyed the support of the masses struggling for a better standard of living, said Meinecke, while nationalism "gathered its main body of adherents . . . from the educated middle class which was enriching itself." Meinecke thought that this middle class and its outlook had also been "a result of the transformations . . . which took place in the old European society after the end of the eighteenth century."³³

Although he was out of sympathy with both, Meinecke admitted that the socialist and nationalist waves had each the right to claim "a deep historical justification": "They were . . . instinctive groping efforts to solve the human problems resulting from a population increase everywhere unprecedented in the history of the world."³⁴ Socialism, which had become a gospel for the masses, "surged up as a mighty wave which . . . swept over the traditional culture of the world." However, Meinecke

pointed out that here also rose, in competition with socialism, "the second mighty wave"--the wave of nationalism.

This second wave flooded crosswise over the first, more or less weakening or diverting it; its aim was not a fundamental social revolution but the increase of the political power of the nation. This second wave was none other than the nationalist movement of the nineteenth century. ³⁵

Salo Wittmayer Baron, the great historian of the Jewish religion, characterized the modern epoch in strikingly similar terms when he spoke of nationalism and class struggle as "determinant factors in the evolution of the modern world." Social revolution, he wrote, was "often dividing nations against themselves and transcending national boundaries." In its course, "it was vastly complicated by the simultaneous nationalist revolution, equally unprecedented in scope and intensity." Baron's further development of this idea offers a capsule overview of the agenda of this book:

While the social revolution was growing ever more international in outlook and its most activist forces were marshaled under the flag of the socialist "International," the nationalist revolution was gaining some of its most substantial victories. In the name of the national principle Italy and Germany, long hopelessly divided, found a new unity and the map of Europe was constantly and forcibly redrawn. A new legitimacy was thereby secured for the most subversive and insurrectional movements in old and venerable empires embracing more than one nationality. Curiously, just when nationalism seemed to reach the apogee of its achievements, when during the First World War it succeeded in breaking up Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Czarist Russia and in securing ever-wider recognition of the principle of "national self-determination," the socialist International achieved its first major victory in the Communist Revolution. ³⁶

If the argument presented here is valid, the conventional map of the correlation of intellectual and political forces in nineteenth-century Europe needs to be redrawn. This applies especially to the location of Marxism on that map. Conventionally, Marxism is seen as a challenge to classical political economy, which in turn is viewed as the ideology that legitimates the capitalist system. Marxism thus appears as a critique of capitalism from "within," a critique speaking on behalf of the society's underdog--the proletariat. What this approach overlooks is that historically Marxism was more than a critique of capitalist relations of production within one country. It was also a critique of nationality (and religion) and a program for the liberation of people from all "intermediate" identities that obstructed an individual's metamorphosis into a "world-historical personality." Marxism postulated the formation of the proletariat as a force that transcended national identities and that operated on a supranational scale. Because of this, from its earliest beginnings, Marxism viewed nationalism as a rival and an enemy.

Marxism's relationships--involving capitalism, communism, *and* national interests--were thus triangular, not bipolar, even though Marx himself and most of his followers understood nationalism as nothing more than an expression of the selfish economic interests of the bourgeoisie and denied that it represented a third party. But in reality, nationalism was such a third party on the battlefield where Marxism met capitalism. Nationalism was a response to the dominance of the advanced capitalist powers of the

West and a critique of the ideology of free trade in particular, and thus in a sense it was an ally of socialism. At the same time, however, it functioned as an alternative not only to classical, "cosmopolitan" capitalism but also to Marxism. As a rival of socialism, it promoted the formation of distinct national communities with their own economic and political interests--communities that emphatically included the workers. By doing so, it ran counter to the attempts of the socialists to build a solidarity of workers along supranational lines. When the Marxists condemned the state--any state, every state--as an instrument of class domination and prophesied that state's "withering away," the nationalists put forward the ideal of the national state.

Thus both Marxism and nationalism in the era between 1789 and 1917/1918 served, to repeat Lichtheim's phrase, as "the theory of one particular kind of revolutionary movement." Nationalism both interpreted the process of nation-building and was thus its "theoretical reflection"; at the same time, it functioned as the historical agent in that process. By analogy with Lichtheim's use of 1917 as the cutoff date in the history of Marxism, it is possible to see the years 1917-1918 as closing an epoch in the history of European nationalism as well. In that period, Marxism confronted nationalism, and Marxism evolved in that confrontation. At the same time, nationalism faced the challenge of Marxism and was in turn influenced by it.

Notes

Chapter 1

1. "Karl Marks o knige F. Lista 'Natsional'naiia sistema politicheskoi ekonomii,'" *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, no. 12 (1971):3-27. The original German version appeared as K. Marx , "Über Friedrich Lists Buch 'Das nationale System der politischen Ökonomie,'" *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung*, no. 3 (1972). It was reprinted as an appendix in Friedrich List, *Das nationale System der politischen Ökonomie*, ed. Günter Fabiunke (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1982), pp. 441-477. The English translation, Karl Marx, "Draft of an Article on Friedrich List Book *Das nationale System der politischen Ökonomie*," is in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 4 (New York: International Publishers, 1975), pp. 265-293. It will be cited here as the "List Critique."
2. Gavin Kitching, "Nationalism: The Instrumental Passion," *Capital and Class*, no. 25 (Spring 1985):115.
3. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 38, p. 28. (See also pp. 11 and 79). Emphasis in the original.
4. Frederick Engels, "Speeches at Elberfeld," *Collected Works*, vol. 4, p. 256. (See pp. 258-259 for specific references to List.) Emphasis in the original. Material from this volume, as well as from volumes 6 and 8 of Marx and Engels' *Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers), is quoted by permission of the publisher.
5. "Speeches at Elberfeld," pp. 261-262. Emphasis in the original.
6. "Speeches at Elberfeld," p. 263.
7. George Lichtheim, *Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study* (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. xiii, 24-25.
8. Lichtheim, *Marxism*, pp. xiv-xv, xvii-xviii.
9. The linkage between the two revolutions--the idea of a "dual revolution"--provides the organizing principle of E. J. Hobsbawm *The Age of Revolution 1789-1848* (New York: New American Library, 1962).
10. Trygve R. Tholfsen, *Ideology and Revolution in Modern Europe: An Essay on the Role of Ideas in History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 76.
11. J. L. Talmon, "The Age of Revolution," *Encounter* 21 (September 1963):15, quoted in Trygve R. Tholfsen, *Ideology and Revolution*, p. 76.
12. François Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 46 and 23, as quoted by Tholfsen, *Ideology and Revolution*, p. 35.
13. Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution*, p. 25, quoted by Tholfsen, *Ideology and Revolution*, p. 36.
14. The following passage in Tholfsen, in which he further cites Furet, is important enough to justify extensive quotation, if only in a footnote:

"As Marx realized in his early writings, the Revolution was the very incarnation of the *illusion of politics*: It transformed mere experience into conscious acts. It inaugurated a world that attributes every social change to known, classified and living forces." The classic form of revolutionary consciousness, expressed in Jacobinism, was founded "on immanence in history, on the realization of values in and by political action, so that those values were at stake in every conflict, were embodied by the actors, and were as discoverable and knowable as truth itself."

(Tholfsen, *Ideology and Revolution*, p. 36, quoting Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution*, pp. 25 and 29.)

[15.](#) Tholfsen, *Ideology and Revolution*, pp. 36-37.

[16.](#) Carlton, J. H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1950), p. 237.

[17.](#) Hayes, *The Historical Evolution*, pp. 232-233.

[18.](#) Hayes, *The Historical Evolution*, p. 249.

[19.](#) Hayes, *The Historical Evolution*, p. 262.

[20.](#) Bertrand Russell, *Freedom versus Organization, 1814-1914* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1949 [first ed. 1934]), p. 8.

[21.](#) Alexander Gerschenkron, "Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective," in a collection of essays titled *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966, reprinted 1979), p. 24.

[22.](#) Gerschenkron, "Economic Backwardness," p. 25.

David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).

[24.](#) This is the point Eley rightly stresses in Blackbourn and Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History*, p. 86.

[25.](#) Alfred Meusel, *List und Marx. Eine vergleichende Betrachtung* (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1928).

[26.](#) Friedrich Lenz, *Friedrich List, die "Vulgärökonomie" und Karl Marx* (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1930).

Karl Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought*, tr. David E. Green (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1967; original Swiss edition published in 1941), p. 133.

[28.](#) Eduard Heimann, *History of Economic Doctrines. An Introduction to Economic Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 130-131.

[29.](#) Heimann, *History of Economic Doctrines*, p. 131.

- [30.](#) Hans Gehrig, *Friedrich List. Wegbereiter einer neuen Wirtschaft* (Berlin: Erich Schmidt, 1966), p. 19.
- [31.](#) Franz Schnabel, *Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert, vol. 3, Erfahrungswissenschaften und Technik* (Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 1954), p. 368.
- [32.](#) Edgar Salin, "Ein Nachwort zur List-Ausgabe als Vorwort für künftige List-Leser," *Mitteilungen der Friedrich-List Gesellschaft* 3, no. 11/ 12 (December 31, 1962):347.
- [33.](#) Friedrich Meinecke, *The German Catastrophe: Reflections and Recollections*, trans. Sidney B. Fay (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), p. 3.
- [34.](#) Meinecke, *The German Catastrophe*, p. 5.
- [35.](#) Meinecke, *The German Catastrophe*, p. 3.
- [36.](#) Baron Salo Wittmayer, *Modern Nationalism and Religion* (New York: Meridian Books; Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1960), p. 1.

Chapter 2

- [1.](#) Frederick Engels, "Preface," in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, ed. and annotated by Friedrich Engels (New York: International Publishers, 1948; reprinted 1966), p. 6. This edition will be cited here and in other chapters, especially Chapter 5, as *The Communist Manifesto*. Engels added:

The proposition, which, in my opinion, is destined to do for history what Darwin's theory has done for biology we, both of us, had been gradually approaching for some years before 1845. How far I had independently progressed towards it, is best shown by my *Condition of the Working Class in England*. But when I again met Marx at Brussels, in spring 1845, he had it already worked out, and put it before me, in terms almost as clear as those in which I have stated it here. ([Ibid.](#))

- [2.](#) Frederick Engels, "On the History of the Communist League," *Selected Works*, vol. 3 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1969), p. 178, as quoted in Gareth Stedman Jones , "Engels and the Genesis of Marxism," *New Left Review*, no. 106 (1977):97.
- [3.](#) See the quotation from *Marx's letter to Ruge (September 1843)* in Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism. Its Origin, Growth, and Dissolution*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 128.
- [4.](#) Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, p. 130.
- [5.](#) Michael Evans, "Karl Marx's First Confrontation with Political Economy: ,"*The 1844 Manuscripts Economy and Society* 13, no. 2 (1984):116. Also see Allen Oakley, *Marx's Critique of Political Economy. Intellectual Sources and Evolution, Vol. 1, 1844 to 1860* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), pp. 29, 74-79, for Marx's study of List in the course of developing his own critique of capitalism. Marx's notes from his reading of List are in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Gesamtausgabe, vierte Abteilung, Exzerpte, Notizen, Marginalien, Band*

2 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1981), pp. 506-546.

- [6.](#) Jones, "Engels and the Genesis of Marxism," p. 98.
- [7.](#) Robert C. Tucker, ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), contains selections from "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right" on pp. 16-25, and "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: ,*Introduction* (i.e., the "Hegel Critique" in our usage), on pp. 53-65. Both texts are available in full in Karl Marx, *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right,'* ed. Joseph O'Malley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), and in Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 3.
- [8.](#) Maximilien Rubel and Margaret Manale, *Marx without Myth: A Chronological Study of His Life and Work* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), p. 40.
- [9.](#) Rubel and Manale, *Marx without Myth*, p. 40.
- [10.](#) Rubel and Manale, *Marx without Myth*, p. 41.
- [11.](#) "Hegel Critique," in Tucker, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, pp. 53-54. Selections from this work are quoted by permission of W. W. Norton & Co., Inc.